​​List of Publications 

BOOKS​​​
PAPERS
BOOK REVIEWS, ETC. ​
Picture
ETHICS

​From Value to Rightness: Consequentialism, Action-Guidance, and the Perspective-Dependence of Moral Duties, New York, NY, and Abingdon: Routledge, 2021.

From Value to Rightness develops new arguments which strongly suggest that, according to the best version of act-consequentialism, the rightness of actions depends on expected rather than actual value. Its findings go beyond the debate about consequentialism and touch on important debates in normative ethics and metaethics. The distinction between criterion of rightness and decision procedures addresses how, why, and in which sense moral theories must be implemented by ordinary persons. The discussion of the rationales of "ought" implies "can" leads to the discovery of a hitherto overlooked moral principle, "ought" implies "evidence", which can be used to show that most prominent moral theories are false. Finally, in the context of discussing cases that are supposed to reveal intuitions that favour either objective or subjective consequentialism, the book argues that which cases are relevant for the discussion of objectivism and subjectivism depends on the type of moral theory we are concerned with (consequentialism, Kantianism, virtue ethics, etc.).
  • The book was discussed at a book symposium at the Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg in October 2019.
  • A discussion of the book is forthcoming in Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung.  


“Prioritarianism, Timeslices, and Prudential Value” (with Anders Herlitz), Australasian Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming).

This paper shows that versions of prioritarianism that at least partially focus on well-being levels at certain times come in conflict with conventional views of prudential value and prudential rationality. So-called timeslice prioritarianism as well as pluralist views that ascribe importance to timeslices hold that benefits matter more the worse off the beneficiary is at the time when they receive it. We show that views that evaluate outcomes in accordance with this idea entail that an agent who delays gratification makes an outcome worse even if it is better for the agent and worse for no one else. We take this to show that timeslice prioritarianism and certain pluralist views violate Weak Pareto, and argue that these versions of prioritarianism are implausible.
​

“Consequentialism and Robust Goods”, Utilitas 31 (3), pp. 334–342.

In this article, I critique the moral theory developed in Philip Pettit's The Robust Demands of the Good: Ethics with Attachment, Virtue, and Respect (STUV). Pettit's theory, which I label Robust-Goods Consequentialism, aims to avoid the problems but retain the attractive features of traditional consequentialist theories. The distinctive feature of Robust-Goods Consequentialism is a value theory that attempts to accommodate what Pettit calls rich goods: certain moral phenomena that can be categorized under the headings of attachment, virtue and respect. I argue that Robust-Goods Consequentialism fails because it implies very implausible value judgements.
​

“Hedonism, Desirability and the Incompleteness Objection”, Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 8 (2), pp. 101–109.

​Hedonism claims that all and only pleasure is intrinsically good. One worry about Hedonism focuses on the “only” part: Are there not things other than pleasure, such as personal projects and relationships, that are intrinsically good? If so, it can be objected that Hedonism is incomplete. In this paper, I defend Hedonism against this objection by arguing for a distinction between goodness and desirability that understands “desirability” as a deontic concept, in terms of “reason to desire”, but goodness as an evaluative concept. Based on this distinction, I attempt to show that Hedonists should accept that things other than pleasure, such as personal projects and relationships, are desirable for their own sakes but deny that these things are intrinsically good.


“Objective Consequentialism and the Rationales of ‘ “Ought” Implies “Can” ’ ”, Ratio 30 (1), pp. 72–87.

This paper argues that objective consequentialism is incompatible with the rationales of ‘ “ought” implies “can” ’ – with the considerations, that is, that explain or justify this principle. Objective consequentialism is the moral doctrine that an act is right if and only if there is no alternative with a better outcome, and wrong otherwise. An act is obligatory if and only if it is wrong not to perform it. According to ‘ “ought” implies “can” ’, a person is morally obligated to φ only if the person can φ. The rationales of ‘ “ought” implies “can” ’ include considerations related to intuitive plausibility, action‐guidance, blameworthiness and fairness, and the nature of practical reasons.


​“Fremdgehen und kollektive Verantwortung”, philosophie.ch – Swiss Portal For Philosophy. (Open Access)

Dieser Beitrag behandelt das Verhalten derjenigen Person, mit der jemand fremdgeht, die aber selbst nicht fremdgeht – etwa, weil sie gar keinen Partner hat, dem sie fremdgehen könnte. Wie ist das Verhalten dieser Person – nennen wir sie der Einfachheit halber: die beteiligte Person – moralisch zu beurteilen? Der Beitrag argumentiert für die These, dass auch das Verhalten der beteiligten Person moralisch falsch ist, und zwar aus folgendem Grund: Die beteiligte Person verletzt die Pflicht, sich nicht an gemeinsamen Handlungen zu beteiligen, von denen man weiß, dass sie die Verletzung von Pflichten implizieren.


“Multi-Dimensional Consequentialism and Degrees of Rightness” (with Attila Tanyi), Philosophical Studies 173 (3), pp. 711–731. (Open Access) 

In his recent book, The Dimensions of Consequentialism, Martin Peterson puts forward a new version of consequentialism that he dubs ‘multidimensional consequentialism’. The defining thesis of the new theory is that there are irreducible moral aspects that jointly determine the deontic status of an act. In defending his particular version of multidimensional consequentialism, Peterson advocates the thesis—he calls it DEGREE—that if two or more moral aspects clash, the act under consideration is right to some non-extreme degree. This goes against the orthodoxy according to which—Peterson calls this RESOLUTION—each act is always either entirely right or entirely wrong. The argument against RESOLUTION appeals to the existence of so-called deontic leaps: the idea is that endorsing RESOLUTION would not give each relevant moral aspect its due in the final analysis. Our paper argues that, contrary to Peterson, (1) all moral aspects remain visible in what can properly be called the final analysis of a moral theory that involves RESOLUTION, (2) moral aspects do not have to remain visible in judgements of all-things-considered rightness or wrongness, respectively, (3) introduction of what Peterson calls verdictive reasons does not change the overall picture in favour of DEGREE. We conclude that multi-dimensional consequentialists should accept RESOLUTION rather than DEGREE.


“Is Objective Consequentialism Compatible with the Principle That ‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’?”, Philosophia 44 (1), pp. 63–77.  (Open Access)

Some philosophers hold that objective consequentialism is false because it is incompatible with the principle that “ought” implies “can”. Roughly speaking, objective consequentialism is the doctrine that you always ought to do what will in fact have the best consequences. According to the principle that “ought” implies “can”, you have a moral obligation to do something only if you can do that thing. Frances Howard-Snyder has used an innovative thought experiment to argue that sometimes you cannot do what will in fact have the best consequences because you do not know what will in fact have the best consequences. Erik Carlson has raised two objections against Howard-Snyder’s argument. This paper examines Howard-Snyder’s argument as well as Carlson’s objections, arguing that Carlson’s objections do not go through but Howard-Snyder’s argument fails nonetheless. Moreover, this paper attempts to show that objective consequentialism and other objectivist moral theories are compatible with the principle that “ought” implies “can”. Finally, this paper analyses a special kind of inability: ignorance-induced inability.


“Multi-Dimensional Consequentialism and Risk” (with Attila Tanyi), Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (1), pp. 49–57. (Open Access)

​In his new book, The Dimensions of Consequentialism, Martin Peterson proposes a version of multi-dimensional consequentialism according to which risk is one among several dimensions. We argue that Peterson’s treatment of risk is unsatisfactory. More precisely, we discuss a number of major problems of one-dimensional (objective or subjective) consequentialism, and show that none of them disappears with Peterson’s proposal. In ending our paper, we address the objection that our discussion overlooks the fact that Peterson’s proposal is not the best version of multi-dimensional consequentialism. Our reply is that the possibilities of improving multi-dimensional consequentialism are very limited as far as risk is concerned.


“The Ramifications of Error Theories about the Deontic”, Acta Analytica 30 (4), pp. 429–445. (Open Access)

Error theories about practical deontic judgements claim that no substantive practical deontic judgement is true. Practical deontic judgements are practical (rather than theoretical) in the sense that they concern actions (rather than beliefs), and they are deontic (rather than evaluative) in the sense that they are about reasons, rightness, wrongness, and obligations (rather than about goodness, badness, and so on). This paper assumes the truth of an error theory about practical deontic judgements in order to examine its ramifications. I defend three contentions. The first is that, if so-called fitting-attitude analyses of value fail, the truth of some substantive evaluative judgements would not be threatened by the fact that no substantive practical deontic judgment is true. Secondly, in light of the truth of these evaluative judgements, the best thing we could do is to continue to make practical deontic judgements despite the truth of an error theory about practical deontic judgements. My third contention is that, if some evaluative judgements are unaffected by an error theory about practical deontic judgements, then such an error theory will eventually lead us to some version of consequentialism.


“Is It Bad to Be Disabled? Adjudicating Between the Mere-Difference and the Bad-Difference Views of Disability” (with Joachim Wündisch), Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy 9 (3), pp. 1–16. (Open Access)

In her recent article, „Valuing Disability, Causing Disability” Elizabeth Barnes has defended the mere-difference view of disability. According to this view, disability does not by itself make disabled people worse off on balance. Rather, if disability has a negative impact on wellbeing overall, this is only so because society is not treating disabled people the way it ought to treat them. In objection to the mere-difference view, it has been argued, roughly, that the view licenses the permissibility of causing disability and the impermissibility of causing nondisability. Barnes attempts to show that this causation-based objection does not succeed. We disagree and argue why. While Barnes’ specific argument is unconvincing, it unearths an important challenge for anyone who wishes to adjudicate between the mere-difference and the bad-difference views of disability in a way that enables a dialogue between the proponents of both views. We offer considerations to overcome that challenge. 


“Objective Consequentialism and the Licensing Dilemma”, Philosophical Studies 162 (3), pp. 547–566.

​Frank Jackson has put forward a famous thought experiment of a physician who has to decide on the correct treatment for her patient. Subjective consequentialism tells the physician to do what intuitively seems to be the right action, whereas objective consequentialism fails to guide the physician’s action. I suppose that objective consequentialists want to supplement their theory so that it guides the physician’s action towards what intuitively seems to be the right treatment. Since this treatment is wrong according to objective consequentialism, objective consequentialists have to license it without calling it right. I consider eight strategies to spell out the idea of licensing the intuitively right treatment and argue that objective consequentialism is on the horns of what I call the licensing dilemma: Either the physician’s action is not guided towards the intuitively right treatment. Or the guidance towards the intuitively right treatment is ad hoc in some respect or the other.


“The Case of the Miners”, Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy 7 (1), pp. 1–9. ​(Open Access)

The Miners Case has been put forward by Derek Parfit (1988) and has recently gained attention due to an article by Niko Kolodny and John MacFarlane (2010). The Miners Case goes like this: Ten miners are trapped either in shaft A or in shaft B, but we do not know which. Flood waters threaten to flood the shafts. We have enough sandbags to block one shaft, but not both. If we block one shaft, all the water will go into the other shaft, killing any miners inside it. If we block neither shaft, both shafts will fill halfway with water, and just one miner, the lowest in the shaft, will be killed. On the one hand, it seems plausible that we ought to block neither shaft. On the other hand, it seems plausible that we ought to block the shaft the miners are in. These judgements seem to be contradictory. I attempt to solve this apparent contradiction by arguing that the “ought” in “we ought to block neither shaft” is to be understood as an “ought to do” whereas the “ought” in “we ought to block the shaft the miners are in” is to be understood as an “ought to be”.


“Eine Kritik an Norbert Hoersters Theorie der Normenvertretung”, Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 64 (1), pp. 62–83. 

Den Kern von Norbert Hoersters Moraltheorie stellt eine Moralbegründung dar, in welcher Hoerster im Rekurs nicht nur auf egoistische, sondern auch altruistische und ideelle Interessen zeigen will, dass es für (fast) jeden Menschen rational ist, bestimmte Moralnormen zu vertreten. Moralnormen werden dabei verstanden als Normen, die – im Gegensatz etwa zu Rechtsnormen – nicht nur an bestimmte Menschen gerichtet sind, sondern an alle Menschen. In diesem Aufsatz versuche ich zu zeigen, , dass Hoersters Theorie scheitert. Egoistische und altruistische Interessen sind nicht hinreichend, um Moralnormen zu begründen. Denn egoistische und altruistische Interessen sind nicht davon tangiert, wenn diese Normen in örtlich oder zeitlich entfernten Gesellschaften nicht gelten: Das eigene Wohlbefinden ist dadurch ebenso wenig beeinträchtigt wie das Wohlergehen derjenigen Personen, die einem nahestehen.


“David Gauthiers kontraktualistische Moralbegründung”, Aufklärung und Kritik 33, pp. 80–104.

​David Gauthier versucht zu zeigen, dass es für alle individuellen Akteure rational ist, bestimmte Beschränkungen im Hinblick auf seine Entscheidungsfindungen zu akzeptieren, so dass problematische Optionen (Stehlen, Morden, Lügen, Versprechen-Brechen) ausgeblendet werden. Die Idee ist hierbei, dass ein Akteur seine Präferenzen langfristig am besten realisiert, wenn er derartige Beschränkungen akzeptiert, weil anderenfalls die Kooperation mit diesem Akteur für andere Akteure nicht rational ist. In diesem Aufsatz versuche ich zu zeigen, dass Gauthiers Entwurf scheitert, weil die von Gauthier dafür angeführten Gründe, dass das individuelle Akzeptieren von Beschränkungen im Hinblick auf mögliche Kooperationen rational ist, nicht überzeugend sind. Zum einen lassen sich auf den von Gauthier gemachten (instrumentellen) Annahmen lediglich Beschränkungen als rational erweisen, die unter den tatsächlichgerade in einer Gesellschaft akzeptieren Normen Kooperation ermöglichen. Die tatsächlich gerade geltenden Normen müssen dabei allerdings keineswegs derart sein, dass sie von allen betroffenen Personen alternativen Normen gegenüber vorgezogen würden. Zum anderen genügen im Hinblick auf die Kooperationsmöglichkeiten unvollständige Beschränkungen. Stehlen, Morden usw. können somit im Ausnahmefall – wenn dieses Verhalten etwa klarerweise unentdeckt bleiben wird – aus Sicht der instrumentellen Vernunft geboten sein. 

POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY

"Is the All-Subjected Principle Extensionally Adequate?", Res Publica. (Open Access)

​This paper critiques the All-Subjected Principle. The All-Subjected Principle is one of the most prominent answers to the Boundary Problem, which consists in determining who should be entitled to participate in which democratic decision. The All-Subjected Principle comes in many versions, but the general idea is that all people who are subjected in a relevant sense with regard to a democratic decision should be entitled to participate in that decision. One respect in which versions of the All-Subjected Principle differ concerns how to best understand ‘subjectedness’. One view spells out ‘subjectedness’ in terms of legal bindingness. Another view understands ‘subjectedness’ in terms of coercion. I argue that the All-Subjected Principle is extensionally inadequate on both views in that it yields verdicts that are at odds with our considered judgements about certain cases. These cases involve legal norms of referral or international administrative assistance.


“Hobbesianische Theorien des Sozialvertrags”, Aufklärung und Kritik 69, pp. 93–104.

Dieser Aufsatz bietet einen allgemeinen Überblick über den Kontraktualismus in der Tradition von Thomas Hobbes. In systematischer Hinsicht setzt sich der Aufsatz kritisch mit drei Problemen auseinander, mit denen der Hobbesianismus unabhängig davon konfrontiert ist, ob man ihn als Moraltheorie oder als normative politische Theorie versteht. Erstens besitzen Machtverhältnisse im Hobbesianismus normative Relevanz – wer über keinerlei Macht verfügt, dem werden im Hobbesianismus auch keinerlei Rechte eingeräumt. Dies ist nicht normativ akzeptabel. Zweitens ist das Hobbesianische Kriterium der Zustimmbarkeit (zu Moralnormen bzw. politischen Institutionen) problematisch. Es ist nicht zu sehen, weshalb bloß hypothetische, im Gegensatz zu tatsächlicher, Zustimmung zu politischen Institutionen normativ relevant sein sollte. Drittens führt der Aufsatz aus, dass die für den Hobbesianismus geltend gemachten metaethischen Argumente – insbesondere solche, die auf die Vereinbarkeit des Hobbesianismus mit dem metaphysischen Naturalismus verweisen – nicht überzeugend sind.


“How Do Affected Interests Support Global Democracy?”, Journal of Global Ethics 13(3), pp. 264–278.
​
In this paper, I critique one way of arguing for global democracy on grounds of affected interests and defend another. A famous argument for global democracy, which I call the Demos-Based Argument, attempts to justify global democracy based on the claim that affected interests vindicate individual claims to democratic participation or representation. I analyze and evaluate the Demos-Based Argument and consider different ways of interpreting and justifying its crucial premise: the Principle of Affected Interests. The result is that the argument fails. One lesson of the discussion of the Demos-Based Argument is that the most promising, though eventually unsuccessful, justification of the Principle of Affected Interests is utilitarian. Given the failure of the Demos-Based Argument, the question suggests itself if there is another way to argue for global democracy on utilitarian grounds. I will outline a promising alternative argument for global democracy, which I call the Direct Argument. Like the Demos-Based Argument, the Direct Argument is based on affected interests and ultimately on utilitarianism, but unlike the former, the Direct Argument avoids the detour over stating a criterion for individual claims to democratic participation and representation.


“Ein Plädoyer für den Rechtsnormen-Konsequentialismus” (with Martin Kerz), Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie – Beihefte 140, pp. 87–99.

In diesem Aufsatz führen wir aus, dass viele der gegen den Konsequentialismus geltend gemachten Einwände den Konsequentialismus lediglich als Moraltheorie, in der es um die Beurteilung individueller Handlungen geht, betreffen, nicht jedoch als politische Theorie, in der es um die Bewertung von demokratischen und anderen Institutionen geht. Die Leitidee besteht darin, dass der Konsequentialismus verstanden als Theorie politischer Rechtfertigung das Potential besitzt, die positiven Aspekte von Akt- und Regel-Konsequentialismus zu vereinen. Konkret entwickelt der Aufsatz eine neue Form von Konsequentialismus, den Rechtsnormen-Konsequentialismus, und führt aus, dass der Rechtsnormen-Konsequentialismus als kollektiver Akt-Konsequentialismus verstanden werden kann. Als kollektiver Akt-Konsequentialismus behandelt der Rechtsnormen-Konsequentialismus die Frage, welche Rechtsnormen in Geltung zu setzen bzw. zu belassen sind und welche nicht.


“Can Groups Be Autonomous Rational Agents? – A Challenge to the List-Pettit Theory”, in: A. Konzelmann-Ziv, H.-B. Schmid (eds.), Institutions, Emotions, and Group Agents – Contributions to Social Ontology, Dordrecht: Springer, pp. 343–353. 

Christian List and Philip Pettit argue that some groups qualify as rational agents over and above their members. Examples include churches, commercial corporations, and political parties. According to the theory developed by List and Pettit, these groups qualify as agents because they have beliefs and desires and the capacity to process them and to act on their basis. Moreover, the alleged group agents are said to be rational to a high degree and even to be fit to be held morally responsible. And the group agents under consideration are autonomous, according to the List-Pettit Theory, because their beliefs and desires cannot easily be reduced to the beliefs and desires of the groups’ members. I want to show that we should not accept the List-Pettit Theory, because it implies the absurd claim that instrument-user-units, like car-driver-units, are rational agents over and above their user-parts, say drivers. The focus of my argument is on whether instrument-user-units are autonomous in relation to their user-parts on the List-Pettit Theory.


PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
​
“God and Eternal Boredom” (with Attila Tanyi), Religious Studies 53 (1), pp. 51–70.

God is thought to be eternal. Does this mean that he is timeless? Or is he, rather, omnitemporal? In this article we argue that God cannot be omnitemporal. Our starting point, which we take from Bernard Williams's article on the Makropulos Case, is the intuition that it is inappropriate for persons not to become bored after a sufficiently long sequence of time has passed. If Williams is right, then it follows that, if God were omnitemporal, he would suffer from boredom. But God is the greatest possible being and therefore cannot be bored. God, hence, is not omnitemporal. After the presentation of our argument, we address several objections by examining possible differences between human and divine persons.